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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOL. VIII DECEMBER, 1933 No. 1
"VALUE-_ PLEA FOR UNIFORMITY IN NEW
YORK COMMERCIAL LAW
"1 7ALUm," is a key-word in the solution of many problems
V of commercial law. Innocence and good faith, linked
with this ingredient of value, combine to place the litigant in
a favored position before the courts. To begin no earlier than
the classic case of Price v. Neal,' one may detect the surge
of a growing movement which has lifted the bona fide pur-
chaser to a high plane and has mantled him with a protective
armor which it is difficult to penetrate. The maxim, "Where
the equities are equal, the holder of the legal title prevails," 2
has become one of the safest standards to follow at law and
in equity and in its application "value" stands forth as an
essential element in the determination of equality of equi-
ties.3 But what is "value" and who are "purchasers for
value"? However debatable may be the current theories of
certainty or uncertainty of law 4 it seems that the stuff that
'3 Burr 1354 (1762); see also National Park Bank v. Ninth National
Bank, 46 N. Y. 77 (1871); Springs v. Hanover Bank, 209 N. Y. 224, 103 N. E.
156 (1913).
Italics used throughout this paper are the present writer's.
2"The true principle, it is submitted, upon which cases like Price v. Neal
are to be supported, is that as between two persons having equal, equities, one
of whom must suffer, the legal title shall prevail." Ames, The Doctrine of
Price v. Neal (1891) 4 HARV. L. REv. 297, 299.
In the following discussion of value, the writer is assuming that the
requirements of legal title and good faith are satisfied. Of course, value may
be present in a given transfer and yet the absence of title or the presence of
notice may defeat the rights of the holder or purchaser for value. Corn
Exchange Bank v. The Nassau Bank, 91 N. Y. 73 (1883).
'Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487, 493, 89 N. E. 1082
(1909).
'See writer's articles, Men or Laws (1932) 2 BxLYN. L. REv. 11; How
Do Judges Decide Cases? address before the Mount Vernon Lawyers' Associa-
tion, March 1, 1933, reprinted in the Westchester Law Journal, March 2, 1933;
To Hunch or Not to Hunch, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 7, 1933.
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makes for value and enters thereby into the makeup of a
purchaser for value should be, and can be, defined with rea-
sonable accuracy.5 Value should be so defined, because it is
imperative that commercial transactions move forward to
permanent execution unhampered by doubts and disputes as
to the meaning of "value"; "value" can be so defined because,
after all, "value" merely calls for a classification of things
and relations of factual content, the presence or absence of
which may easily be detected in the run of the mine cases.
The scope of the present paper is limited to the field of
commercial law and that part thereof which centers about
documents of title and goods passing through the channels
of commerce. It is further narrowed to the discussion of
value in commercial transactions wherein creditors take any
of the above instruments or goods in settlement of or as
security for antecedent debts. The main objective will be to
determine whether the creditor so receiving personal prop-
erty from his debtor (by way of payment of or security for
past debts) comes or should come within the charmed circle
of purchasers for value. One more restriction, the examina-
tion is confined to New York statutory law and aims prima-
rily to discuss inconsistencies of the local law in the tests of
"value" as applied to creditors, which seem to the writer to
be unfortunate and indefensible.8
Cf. Rothschild, Men and Law (1932) 1 BKLYN. L. REv. 1; Bachrach,
Reflections on Brief Writing, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 16-20, 1933.
For an excellent review of the pending controversy anent the certainty
and uncertainty of law, read Cardozo, Address Before the New York State Bar
Association (1932) 55 REPORTS OF THE N. Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 263.5 This statement would probably be denied by Jerome Frank, who seems to
be of the opinion that efforts to make the law more predictable or more certain
are "doomed to failure." FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 361, 362. Of
special interest in connection with the matter of "value" herein considered is
Frank's unwillingness to concede that rules governing commercial or business
transactions can be "authoritatively prescribed in advance." He likewise takes
exception to Dean Pound's modest assumption that "there is nothing unique in
a bill of exchange." FRANK, id. at 208-209. Cf. Kennedy, Met or Laws,
supra note 4; Clark, Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 643.
, Cf. Whitney, Value and the Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchaser (1933) 7
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 182, 204: "It would seem that the present common and
statutory law prevailing in New York State in reference to the standard of
value required under the doctrine of bona fide purchase, differing as it does in
respect to differing kinds of property, is in the main both economically sound
and legally and equitably defensible."
In so far as Professor Whitney's generalization applies to the subject
matter of this paper, it will be later considered.
VALUE
THE PROBLEM.
Today, more than ever before, creditors are faced with
the formidable task of collecting debts from delinquent
debtors.7 Confronted with the alternative of a payment in
cash at a remote period or taking present security or pay-
ment in the form of goods, negotiable paper, stock certifi-
cates, warehouse receipts, or bills of lading, the business
sagacity of the creditor prompts him to accept available
commercial documents or goods in discharge of or as security
for overdue accounts. Taking these documents or goods in good
faith from the debtor who is the apparent owner, the creditor
is later confronted with the unpleasant discovery that the
debtor's title is defective and that the prior owner claims a
right to pursue his property into the hands of the creditor
and to recapture the property or its value. Assuming that
the debtor has a title, voidable though it may be, what is the
position of the creditor with relation to the property so trans-
ferred to him? Is he to be classed as a bona fide purchaser
and therefore divorced from latent equities which attach to
the property while it remains in the hands of the debtor?
Or, does he fail in his claim as a "purchaser" because he
gave no "value" by merely receiving property to secure or to
discharge past indebtedness due from the debtor?
THE ANSWER.
In any state which has adopted without change the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act, the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act s it seems
"Internationally, nationally and individually the collection and readjustment
of indebtedness are among our most pressing problems. DENNIS, Is CAPITAL-
ISM! DOOMED? (1932) 282-294; EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A CHALLENGE TO AMER-
ICA (1933) C. XXXV; SELDES, THE YEARS OF THE LOCUST (1933) passim;
TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE (1933) c. VIL
The problem of debt settlement is by no means exclusively an economic
one; it is at once reflected in legislation. Note the mortgage moratorium
acts, the refinancing of farm mortgages under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, etc. The constitutionality of the "New Deal" legislation opens up limit-
less questions of novel and grave character.
'These five uniform acts, which form the basis of the present criticism of
New York law, have been widely adopted by the states. The Uniform Nego-
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that the stated problem may readily be answered. Whether
the creditor receives from his debtor a negotiable instrument,
bill of lading, goods, warehouse receipt or stock certificate in
payment of or as security for an antecedent debt, the creditor
by his act of cancelling or securing the existing debt is
deemed to have given "value." Regardless of the quality or
kind of personal property so transferred to the creditor by
the debtor, the swing of statutory law and the decisions
interpreting the statutory definition of "value" found in the
uniform acts elevate a creditor to the position of a purchaser
for value without further consideration given by him than
the acceptance of the personal property in discharge of or
as security for an indebtedness owing from the debtor to the
creditor.9 This uniformity and standardization of value,
independent of the accidental nature of the thing given
(whether a chose in action or in possession) has been accom-
plished by the simple expedient of writing into the five
uniform acts a single formula of value. The key-principle in
all these uniform acts is to the effect that an antecedent or
pre-existing debt constitutes value whether the personal
property is taken in satisfaction of or as security for the
debt. The definition of value in the Uniform Sales Act may
be used to illustrate the general tenor of the statutory defini-
tions of value found in the uniform acts:
"'Value' is any consideration sufficient to sup-
port a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing
claim, whether for money or not, constitutes value
where goods or documents of title are taken either in
satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." 10
tiable Instruments Law has been passed in fifty-five states and territories; the
Uniform Sales Act, in thirty states and territories; the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act, in twenty-eight states and territories; the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, in fifty states and territories; and the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, in twenty-three states and territories. Revised Table of States, Supple-
ment, 1932, Uniform Laws Annotated.
'BRANNAN, NEG. INST. LAW (4th ed. 1926) 222-245; Standard Bank v.
Lowman, 1 F. (2d) 935 (W. D. N. D. 1924); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bank
of America, 23 F. (2d) 939 (N. D. Ill. 1928) ; General Motors Accept. Corp.
v. Baker Mfg. Co., 119 Iowa 155, 201 N. W. 774 (1925); Roland M. Baker
Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913). See also National City
Bank v. Wagner, 216 Fed. 473 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914).
"0 UNIFORM SALES ACT §25; see substantially similar definitions of "value"
in UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §53, UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT
§58, and UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT §22.
VALUE
It seems clear, from a reading of these definitions of
value, from the declarations of policy by the Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws 11 and from the decisions construing
the uniform legislation 12 that these five uniform acts set
forth one standard definition of value.
New York has enacted into its statutes the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law,13 the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act,14 the Uniform Sales Act, 15 the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, 6 and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.'1
Thus the movement to render uniform the law touching
sales, negotiable instruments and mercantile documents of
title has received strong support from New York, the market-
place and trading post of the nation; the persuasive example
of the Empire State has been no small factor in the success
of this movement for uniformity of commercial law. If this
were the whole story, one might conclude that New York
would, in accordance with provisions of value contained in
the five uniform acts, hold that a creditor gives "value" when
he cancels or secures a debt by taking a negotiable instru-
ment, warehouse receipt, goods, bill of lading or stock certifi-
cate. And this generalization would be sound were it not for
the fact that the New York Legislature strangely eliminated
from two of the five uniform acts the definition of value and
substituted no definition in lieu thereof. Rather signifi-
The definition of "value" in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is
somewhat different. Section 25 reads as follows: "Value is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt is
value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at
a future time." Despite the difference, the creditor receiving a negotiable
instrument has been held to give value. BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 9.
Indeed, Williston, in drafting the Sales Act, borrowed this definition of value
with some clarifying changes from the Negotiable Instruments Law. WILLIS-
TON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §620.
U UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING AcT, 4 Uniform Laws Annot. 78; UNIFORM
STocK TRANSFER AcT, 6 Uniform Laws Annot. 26; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
REcEIPTs ACT, 3 Uniform Laws Annot. 93; UNIFORM SALES AcT, 1 Uniform
Laws Annot. 448.
'Supra note 9. Incidentally, it may be observed that there are other
attacks upon the formalism of consideration in consensual undertakings. Finn,
The Forging of Good Unilaterals Out of Bad Bilaterals (1933) 3 BKLYN. L.
REv. 6.
" N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612; N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
" N. Y. Laws 1911, c. 248; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§187-241.
" N. Y. Laws 1911, c. 571; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§82-158.
" N. Y. Laws 1907, c. 732; N. Y. GENERAL BUSINESs LAW §§90-143.
'IN. Y. Laws 1913, c. 600; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§162-182.
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cantly, the omission occurred in the Uniform Sales Act and
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, which were passed by the
Legislature in the same year. The remaining three acts-the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Warehouse Receipts
Act and the Stock Transfer Act-were enacted without the
omission of the clause defining "value."
The writer has elsewhere summarized this situation in
New York:
"What is the result? A creditor is a purchaser for
value in New York today if he takes a negotiable
instrument or .warehouse receipt or stock certificate
either (1) to secure or (2) to pay off a pre-existing
debt. But a creditor is not a purchaser for value if he
takes goods or a bill of lading under the same circum-
stances. So a creditor's right to be considered a
holder for valuable consideration depends upon the
accidental and, it is submitted, immaterial character
of the property which is involved in the particular
transaction." 18
It is now intended to consider the reasons prompting the
Commissioners of Uniform Laws to erect a single standard
of value in the uniform commercial laws and to weigh against
these reasons the abortive treatment of value in the New
York statutes which destroys uniformity within and without
the state and makes for confusion and injustice.
A BIT OF REALISM.
One hears much these days about the functional ap-
proach and realistic jurisprudence. 9 These forward looking
processes of attacking legal problems sweep aside syllogistic
logic, verbalism and word-magic 20 and grip the case at hand
'
8 Kennedy, Creditors as Purchasers for Value, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 17,
1930, at 1430.
"9For bibliography of articles developing the realistic viewpoint, see
Goodrich, Our Black Letter Balance (1932) 7 Am. L. SCHOOL REV. 385, 393.
' While the functionalists and the realists have been bitter in their attacks
upon verbalism and word magic (see FRANK, op. cit. supra note 5, cc. VII, X)
there is a growing evidence that they may fall victims of the same vice of
VALUE
by balancing the clash of interests and evaluating economic
factors and commercial practices. While these new schools
of legal thought may claim credit for exposing the limits of
the doctrine of stare decisis 21 one suspects that they not
only overemphasize the factor of change or growth in the
law 22 but that they are also unaware of the fact that change
and evolution were quietly going on long before they arrived
on the juristic scene. "There were brave men before Aga-
memnon," Cardozo reminds us, "and before the dawn of the
last decade there were those who strove to see the truth of
the judicial process, to see it steadily and whole, and to
report what they had seen with sincerity and candor." 23
Williston, at the turn of the century, may not have been
familiar with Vold's "functional perspective," 24 nor with
Llewelyn's definition of sales "as a tool of credit economy" 25
but he set for himself the task of criticizing decisions "where
they seemed opposed to principle and to the convenience of
trade." 26
Realism and the functional approach-rather than con-
ceptualism or stare decisis-are easily detected in the growth
and development of the definition of "value" so as to include
creditors who take goods or instruments of title as security
verbalism in another form. The taking over of speculative theories from social
sciences dressed up in terms that the lawyer cannot pronounce and does not
understand is not productive of solution of legal problems. For example, see
FRANK, op. cit. supra note 5, c. VIII.
I "I cannot doubt that the teachings of the neo-realists were and still are
of great value to jurisprudence in ridding stare decisis of something of its
petrifying rigidity * * *." Cardozo, op. cit. spra note 4.
' "Many students get the impression that it is sufficient if they functionally
approach, whether or where they arrive. * * * I have talked with young
disciples of functionalist teachers who have acquired such a strong antipathy
to-conceptualism, that they are unhappy if a court decides two cases the same
way, if there is any slight difference in the facts." Scott, Confessions of a Law
Teacher (1928) HANKDBOOK OF Ass'N OF Am. L. SCHOOLs 24.
For a practicing attorney's estimate of the functional approach, see Wicker-
sham, Book Review (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 660: "It [the functional approachi
represents a school of thought which, to the writer, seems one of the unfortu-
nate developments of the time. The academic mind delights in uncertainties.
The practical work of the everyday lawyer calls for definite standards by which
the activities of business, commerce and industry are to be conducted."
3 Op. cit. supra note 4.
VOLD, SALES, Preface; Bacon, Book Review (1933) 18 TEMPLE L. Q. 128.
_ LLEWELLYN, CASES ON SALES, Introd., xv.
WiLLISTON, SALES (1st ed. 1909) Preface.
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for or in payment of antecedent debts. 26a The Commissioners
who drafted the single standard of value in the uniform acts
were well aware of the fact that they were departing from
judicial precedents when they declared that "an antecedent
debt * * * constitutes value." But "mercantile convenience"
prompted them to recommend a "single rule" regardless of
the kind of property transferred to the creditor2 Williston
also conceded that common-law cases generally distinguished
between chattels and negotiable paper and held that a credi-
tor taking chattels even in absolute payment of a pre-existing
debt did not thereby become a purchaser for value.28
What then is the basic reason for this overthrow of
precedents and the advocacy of one standard of value to be
uniformly applied in commercial transactions? It is found
in the realistic conclusion that a creditor who receives prop-
erty from his debtor changes his position following the re-
ceipt of this property and it is manifestly unfair to deprive
him of this property on the ground that he did not give fresh
value. Whether the creditor takes goods or documents of
title in payment of or as security for antecedent indebted-
ness this change or alteration of position is almost certain
to follow. Obviously, if the creditor receives the property in
payment of his debt, he rests content on the assumption that
the debt has been paid. If he takes the property as security
for the debt, he is likewise lulled into repose in the confident
belief that the indebtedness is protected.
29
'a The shortcomings of realistic jurisprudence are most pronounced in
attempting to "free" the courts from the chains of precedents. Realism admit-
tedly has a proper place in the shaping of legislation.
- "In regard to property other than negotiable instruments the law of many
states does not regard an antecedent debt as value; but it seems desirable to
have a single rule for what constitutes valuable consideration and mercantile
convenience supports the one adopted." Commissioner's Note, 1 Uniform Laws
Annot. 448, 449.
. The admission of Williston that the precedents are against the statutory
rule of value did not deter him from advocating a change. As the draftsman
of the Sales Act, it was his influence that made possible this change. WILLIS-
TON AND McCuRDY, CASES ON SALES 430, 431.
"Practically such a past consideration has always a present operation.
It stays the hand of the creditor." Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B. D. 376 (1877).
See also WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 26, §620; Whitney, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 195, 196.
The equity of the change-of-position argument is not limited to the present
problem of value; it is soundly applied in matters of estoppel, is visible in
current agitation for the reliance-theory of contract, and forms a substantial
VALUE
Certainly in these days of kaleidoscopic change in per-
sonal fortunes and of rapid rise and fall of business ventures,
it seems an empty gesture to give back the debt to the credi-
tor and to assure him that he has suffered no change of
position. Credit is replacing corporeal wealth as the medium
of exchange 30 especially in the sale of goods 31 and refine-
ments in the definition of value suitable for over-the-counter
transactions during the corner-grocery epoch cannot be satis-
factorily applied to an era which emphasizes forward con-
tracts involving future transactions and credit economy.
CRITIQUE OF NEw YORK LAW.
Whether considered realistically in terms of mercantile
expediency or conceptually in terms of abstract justice, there
seems ample warrant for the standardized definition of value
found in the five unabridged uniform acts set forth. More-
over, it is submitted that there is no good reason why New
York should lag behind the procession of states by stub-
bornly refusing to write into the New York Sales Act 32 and
the New York Bills of Lading Act 33 the omitted section
defining value, especially after its unequivocal indorsement
of this same measure of value in the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, 34 Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 35 and
Uniform Stock Transfer Act.36
In a recent article in this REv w,3 7 Professor Whitney
comments upon the failure of the New York Legislature to
include this definition of value in the Sales Act and the Bills
of Lading Act. While accepting the present writer's conclu-
sion that the omitted section on value should be enacted into
part of quasi-contract law. Knights v. Wiffen, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 660 (1870) ;
Dixon v. Kennaway & Co. [1900] 1 Ch. 833: Contracts Restatement, §90;
KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 59-72; WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRAcTs 38-48.
PoUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 191, 192.
'LLEWELLYN, CASES ON SALES, Introd., xv; VOLD, SALES 3.
' Supra note 15.
-Supra note 14.
'Supra note 13.
Supra note 16.
' Supra note 17.
"r Whitney, supra note 6.
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the Bills of Lading Act of New York, 8 he contests the
advisability or economic soundness of inserting the same
definition of value in the Sales Act of New York.
An extract from his interesting article will make clear
his reasons for this novel distinction:
"It is obvious that chattels, as such, do not, and
need not possess such a high degree of negotiability
as negotiable instruments, negotiable warehouse re-
ceipts and negotiable stock certificates. Therefore,
where the transfer of chattels is effected without the
use of negotiable documents of title, it would seem
that there is not the same commercial necessity for
protecting the innocent purchaser and hence the stan-
dard of value required from him should be somewhat
higher in order to entitle him to keep the goods against
the original defrauded owner. From this economic
point of view the omission of our Legislature to adopt
in the Sales Act the same definition of value as found
in the other Uniform Acts relating to negotiable in-
struments and negotiable documents of title, seems
defensible. But by the same economic test the omis-
sion of the definition of value contained in the Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act seems indefensible."
Is the stated distinction between the transfer of "chat-
tels" and the transfer of "negotiable documents of title" a
practical or equitable basis upon which to erect the variable
standard of value proposed by Professor Whitney? Is it
"socially advantageous" to hold that a creditor is a purchaser
for value when he takes "negotiable documents of title" but
that he is not a purchaser for value when he takes chattels?
The contention is made that, viewed legally or economically,
there is no valid reason for this compromise and that the
definition of value omitted from the Sales Act, as well as the
discarded definition of value in the Bills of Lading Act,
should be enacted into New York law.
" The current statutory situation in New York wherein the distinction is
taken between a bill of lading and a warehouse receipt is difficult to justify.
Both documents are of the same essential nature and the test of value in rela-
tion to creditors should be the same. WLLISTON, Op. cit. . upra note 10, §405.
VALUE
If the change of position by the creditor is the realistic
ground for the enlargement of the area of value, as hereto-
fore suggested,3 9 the creditor's change of position is the same
whether he receives chattels or negotiable documents of title
by way of settlement of the debt. If the creditor stands by in
the belief that the debt has been paid and later the debtor
fails or departs, it is somewhat naive to inform him that he
did not give value because he received a chattel rather than a
negotiable document of title. The pertinent fact is that he
suffers a loss in either case and it is beside the point to
attempt to placate him by a gratuitous lecture on the nego-
tiability of documents of title. Indeed, Professor Whitney
himself forcibly states the case for the creditor elsewhere in
his article in true pragmatic fashion:
"Although the parties may thus be restored to their
original positions as far as legal liabilities are con-
cerned, the innocent purchaser frequently cannot be
put back to his original position so far as its business
aspects are concerned, for the debt may have been
collected had it not been settled for by the transfer of
the goods. When that transfer is later rescinded by
operation of law and the goods restored to the original
defrauded party, the fraudulent buyer may have be-
come insolvent, or have concealed his assets. In such a
case the loss is thrown from the original innocent vic-
tim of the fraud to another equally innocent party,
who has an equal stake in the outcome. Moreover, the
general social effect of the rule that antecedent debt
is not value, is evil since it impairs the security of
transactions." 40
It is further submitted that the stated distinction be-
tween chattels and negotiable documents of title confuses the
totally distinct concepts of "negotiability" and "value." Con-
cededly, the transfer of a chattel is not the transfer of a
negotiable thing. It is also true that the lack of negotiability
of the subject matter transferred to the creditor may prevent
Supra notes 27-29.40Supra note 6.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the transfer of title or spell notice and thereby defeat the
status of the creditor as a purchaser for value. But why
conclude that in this situation the creditor did not give
value? In the given case, even a purchaser paying cash would
be similarly defeated, yet it would not be asserted that he
did not give value.4 The vice of the alleged distinction
between the transfer of chattels and the transfer of nego-
tiable documents of title is that value furnished by the credi-
tor is to be weighed not by what the creditor gives, but rather
by the quality of the thing received. Negotiability of the
subject matter may, and does, enhance and expedite the
transfer of title to the creditor or negative notice, but nego-
tiability does not change the quality of value contributed by
the creditor. The creditor is "out of pocket" in the same
degree whether he gets a chattel or a negotiable document of
title; economic and equitable considerations argue for a
single standard of value.42
A PLEA FOR UNIFORMITY.
The law of New York has long suffered from a "value-
complex" which persists in assaying value in terms of the
'Supra note 2.
2 Professor Whitney seemingly assumes that the definition of value in the
uniform acts (other than the Sales Act) requires the creditor to take a
negotiable instrument or negotiable document of title in order to be classed as a
purchaser for value. He says that "where the transfer of chattels is effected
without the use of negotiable documents of title, it would seem that there is not
the same commercial necessity for protecting the innocent purchaser * * *"
He therefore concludes that "the omission of our Legislature to adopt in the
Sales Act the same definition of value as fotozd in the other Uniform Acts
relating to negotiable instruments and negotiable documents of title seems
defensible."
This assumption that the definition of value in the uniform acts relates
only to negotiable documents of title is apparently incorrect. The UNIFORM
BILLS OF LADING AcT §53, provides that an "antecedent obligation * * .* consti-
tutes value where a bill is taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security
therefor." So, also, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, §58, provides that
an "antecedent obligation * * * constitutes value where a receipt is taken either
in satisfaction thereof, or as security therefor." Cf. Whitney, supra note 3,
at 183. It is not necessary, therefore, for a creditor to receive a negotiable
bill of lading or a negotiable warehouse receipt in order to be a purchaser
for value. See also Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act §58, defining
"receipt" as meaning "warehouse receipt" and Uniform Bills of Lading Act,
§53, defining "bill" as "bill of lading," thereby including within the definitions
non-negotiable as well as negotiable bills of lading and warehouse receipts.
See also UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §§l, 2, 4; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
RECEIPTS AcT §§1, 2, 4.
VALUE
definitely discredited case of Coddington v. Bay.43 Unless
the creditor gives up something besides his debt, there is an
unwillingness to concede that he has satisfied the require-
ments of value. Even after the passage of a statute aiming to
cure this "cracker-barrel" concept of value, the courts are
coldly receptive of the "new deal" in commercial law and
hold fast to the old formula.44 As the writer has elsewhere
stated it:
"Conservatism is a deeply-imbedded characteristic of
the law. Reforms come forth slowly and with expres-
sions of regret for the passing of the old order. Even
after they are accomplished there is a tendency to look
back with longing glances and in some instances to
revive the abandoned principles by artificial and
forced construction of statutory changes." 45
The time has arrived for New York to recognize that its
concept of value is a "stubborn bit of archaic form" which
All the foregoing sections establish the fact that the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act are not limited to
negotiable documents of title. Non-negotiable documents of title are also
included. If Professor Whitney's suggestion as to a variable standard of value
is adopted, the Uniform Acts which he indorses will have to be materially
amended, not only in the section relating to value, but in other sections as well.
For example, see UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING AcT §33; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
RECEIPTS ACT §42; UNIFORM SALES ACT §20 (4).
The present writer believes that the text of the uniform acts should remain
unchanged; that the definitions of value therein extend to non-negotiable as
well as negotiable documents of title; and that this extension was so intended
by the Commissioners for the purpose of erecting one standard of value
throughout the five stated uniform acts.
Admittedly, a non-negotiable document of title may be more readily recap-
tured from the creditor (or any purchaser) by reason of defects in the title of
the debtor-transferor (UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §38; UNIFORM WARE-
HOUSE RECEIPTS ACT §47). But the transferee of a non-negotiable bill of
lading or warehouse receipt has rights of limited character and these rights
should be and are available in favor of a creditor who takes a non-negotiable
bill or receipt in payment of or as security for an antecedent debt. UNIFORM
BILLS OF LADING ACT §33; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AT §42; Rummell
v. Blanchard, 216 N. Y. 348, 110 N. E. 765 (1915); see also UNIFORM SALES
ACT §20 (4), 34.
120 Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822).
' "The New York rfile [that mere credit given for an antecedent debt was
not value] was so well established that the inertia of Coddington v. Bay carried
it along for some distance before the external force of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law acted upon it." Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 537, 121 N. E.
364 (1918). See de Sloovere, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes
(1932) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1, 6-7.
'Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1925) 35 YALE
L. J. 689.
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stands out "like a pile of ancient rock, weathered and de-
nuded, but not yet worn down to the level of the plain where
men dwell and work." 46
Uniformity is the great desideratum in the field of uni-
form legislation and particularly so in the acts dealing with
commercial law, Commerce is no longer local; it transcends
state lines; the contract or sale which originates in New
York frequently terminates in some out of the state point.
For the purpose of effecting this interstate uniformity we
find the Commissioners writing into the uniform acts this
significant section:
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
laws of those states which enact it." 47
In dealing with this section, just as in its treatment of value,
one may detect a strange inconsistency in the statutes in
New York. Accepting the mandate that New York should
aim to effectuate uniformity, the foregoing section was in-
serted in three uniform acts, but omitted without apparent
reason in the passage of the Sales Act.48
Even conceding that the minority view of value prevail-
ing in New York has merit behind it, the attitude of the
Legislature is not free from criticism. Provincialism can be
carried too far in a situation where country-wide transac-
tions are involved. To quote Judge Cardozo: "Our past deci-
sion ought not to stand in opposition to the uniform convic-
tions of the entire judiciary of the land." 41 Parity of reason
argues for the abandonment of past legislative action which
stands opposed to the uniform convictions of the overwhelm-
"
6 POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW (1922) 199.
" UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT §57; UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING
ACT §52; UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT §19; UNIFORM SALES Act §74.
While no such provision is expressly set forth in the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, the courts have read into the law the objective of unifying
the statutory law throughout the states. See cases collected in 5 Uniform
Laws Annot. 8-10.
'The "uniformity" section is in the Bills of Lading Act (PERS. PROP.
LAW §238); the Stock Transfer Act (PERS. PROP. LAW §180) ; and the Ware-
house Receipts Act (GEN. BUS. LAW §141). It was omitted from the Sales
Act (Laws 1911, c. 571).
" Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 386, 114 N. E. 809 (1916).
VALUE
ing number of state legislatures of the land. High judicial
authority pleads the case for liberalism of approach to the
solution of common problems of commercial law:
"It is apparent that if these uniform acts are con-
strued in the several states adopting them according
to former local views upon analogous subjects, we
shall miss the desired uniformity and we shall erect
upon the foundation of uniform language separate
legal structures as distinct as were the former varying
laws. * ** We think that the principle of the Uniform
Act should have recognition to the exclusion of any
inconsistent doctrine which may have previously ob-
tained in any of the states enacting it." 5o
THE REMEDY.
The present difficulty in the status of value in the com-
mercial law of New York is traceable to the unwarranted
omission of the standard definition of value in the Sales Act
and in the Bills of Lading Act. The remedy is to put back
into the statutory law the omitted sections. It has been sug-
gested that "the desired result may * * * be gradually brought
about by judicial decision and interpretation alone without
the aid of statute." 11 The recalcitrant and uncertain atti-
tude of the courts of New York in the past, offers scant hope
for complete or speedy reformation by judicial infiltration.52
" Hughes, J., in Commercial Nat. Bank v. Cahal-Louisiana Bank etc., Co.,
239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct. 194 (1916). In support of the argument against the
provincialism of local law, see Pound, A Comiparison of the Ideals of Law
(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10-12.
1 Whitney, supra note 6, at 203.
'Supra note 44. In Kelso Co. v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 537 (1918), the
Court admits "the habit of bench and bar to look to cases rather than statutes
for principles of commercial law until attention is sharply directed to the extent
that the movement for uniformity of laws through legislation has been success-
ful in New York and many other states."
Professor Whitney quotes the following statement of Cardozo, ., in Bald-
win v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 163 N. E. 737 (1928) as suggestive of a possible
change -in the meaning of value by judicial action: "How far the rule in this
state as to the meaning of 'value' has been changed by the revision of statutes
in cases not affected by the federal rule we do not now consider. If it survives
it has been subjected to many inroads." (Whitney, supra note 5, at 283.) The
statement is dictum in that the Federal Bills of Lading Act alone was before
the court. Moreover, even in New York, while "the meaning of value has been
changed by the revision of statutes" (see supra notes 13, 16, 17), the difficulty
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The realists who crave for action are more likely to obtain it
by recourse to the Legislature. Moreover, it may be ques-
tioned whether the courts should bring in through the back
door a doctrine of value which the Legislature has turned
away from the front door.5 3 If the courts were to do so, they
would be ignoring the mandates or implications of the stat-
ute, a step which Justice Cardozo admits the judges have
the power, but not the right to take.34
The more orderly, prompt and satisfactory solution is
the simple expedient of replacing the omitted sections of
value in the Sales Act and the Bills of Lading Act. By so
doing, New York will at once render uniform the standard
of value within the state and will also pay tribute to the
settled policy of sister states in this important item of
commercial law.
WALTER B. KENNEDY.
Fordliam University Law School,
November 21, 1933.
is that "the meaning of 'value'" was not changed when the Sales Act and the
Bills of Lading Act passed the New York Legislature (supra notes 14, 15).
' Cardozo warns that the province of the judge as a legislator is closely
circumscribed. "He [the judge] legislates between gaps." NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 113. But the omission of the definition of "value" is more
than a gap; it is an intentional elimination from the Uniform Sales Act and
Uniform Bills of Lading Act of the definition of value.
For an example of the extreme deference which the courts sometimes pay
to legislative policy, see Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 395, 187 N. E. 381,
385 (1933), wherein the Court cites a legislative act passed after the litigated
event as some evidence of public policy; de Sloovere, op. cit. supra note 44.
" CARDOZO, op. cit. mi-pra note 53, at 129.
